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Abstract 
 
We use personnel data from a Russian firm for the years 1997 to 2002 to study the 
determinants of wages during transition. Our findings indicate that remuneration is 
not predetermined by formal rules and a stable institutionalized structure of wages, 
but rather that local labor market conditions have a strong impact on wage setting at 
the firm level. In particular, we document that real wages fall substantially during a 
period of high inflation and worsening local labor market conditions. Relative wage 
decreases are most pronounced for employees who initially earned the highest rents. 
The process of rent extraction leads to a strong compression of real wages and real 
compensation at the firm. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The literature on wage formation and wage inequality in Russian labor markets, 
limited in scope and often constrained by data quality has left many controversial 
issues unresolved. One of the more fundamental issues is the question of which 
considerations drive managers in the wage determination process. Are Russian wages, 
for example, formed mainly by institutional factors related to industrial relations and 
internal labor markets as stressed by Clarke (2002) and Kapelyushnikov (2002) 
among others, or are managers in their wage decisions mainly led by the interplay of 
conditions in local labor markets, labor market institutions and considerations to 
achieve an optimal level of turnover of the workforce?  
The first approach, which for shorthand we may call the industrial relations 
approach to wage determination in Russia, is aptly summarized by Clarke (2002): 
“The pattern of change in the structure of wages in Russia is consistent with the 
supposition that employers follow the line of least resistance and in the first instance 
adjust their hiring and management practices to a relatively stable level and structure 
of wages, raising money wages uniformly more or less in line with inflation, although 
with a lag that is the longer the more hard-pressed is the employer, so that 
differentials emerge corresponding to the relative prosperity of firms.” Clarke’s 
argumentation takes recourse to two strands in the literature on wage formation, the 
industrial relations institutional literature, which sees the wage structure in a firm the 
result of bargaining between production managers, human resource managers and top 
management, and the early literature on internal labor markets (Dunlop, 1957, and 
Doeringer and Piore, 1971).  Both these strands, dealing with developed capitalist 
economies, point to the need to protect the workforce in the firm from shocks that 
occur in the outside labor market by maintaining a stable and “fair” relative wage 
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structure also in times of economic hardship. Can wage differentiation in Russia 
during transition really be explained well by this approach? Are local labor market 
conditions really as irrelevant as maintained by Clarke?   
The second approach to the analysis of Russian wage formation extends 
standard models of wage determination in capitalist economies to Russia, and assigns 
an important role to local labor market conditions in the wage formation process. No 
matter how much bargaining power of workers and employers is assumed in the 
models underlying the studies, i.e. independent of whether both agents are assumed to 
have substantial bargaining power as in the studies of Brainerd (2002), Luke and 
Schaffer (2000) and Commander, Dhar and Yemtsov (1996), whether employers 
decide unilaterally over wage levels and structure as is mooted in the study by 
Lehmann, Wadsworth, and Acquisti (1999), or whether the assumption of competitive 
labor markets is maintained (see e.g. Commander, McHale and Yemtsov, 1995), local 
labor market conditions are assumed to have a major impact on the decision making 
process as well as on outcomes.  
Having unique longitudinal personnel data from a Russian manufacturing 
firm, which includes wages and bonuses of each employee, we provide new evidence 
on the issue of wage formation and differentiation in Russia. If the “industrial 
relations school” is right, then firms that have increasing profits should attempt to 
maintain real wage levels as much as is feasible in times of inflation and reverse real 
wage losses when inflation subsides. And local labor market conditions should play a 
very subordinate role, if any. We are fortunate to have personnel data for the years 
1997 to 2002, a period that includes an episode of high inflation in the aftermath of 
the August 1998 financial crisis. In addition, the firm in question is in the reported 
period one of the few enterprises in the sector “machine building and metal works”, 
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which is able to maintain its employment level and shows a strong profit performance. 
Given our longitudinal personnel data and the profit situation of the firm we are able 
to provide direct evidence on the validity of the prediction put forth by Clarke and 
others from the “industrial relations school” of Russian wage formation. 
To see whether and how important labor market conditions affect wages, we 
need, of course, information about the local labor market in which the firm operates. 
The information we use to this purpose is taken from regional Goskomstat data and 
from a sample of 33 industrial firms in the same region where the firm is active.  We 
also interviewed the director general of the firm (CEO), after we had analyzed the 
personnel wage data, to get confirmation or clarification on the motives of 
management regarding its wage policies.  
The main results in the final analysis provide little evidence for the prediction 
put forth by Clarke and others of the “industrial relations school”; our results rather 
show that local labor market conditions are one of the main driving forces 
determining management’s wage policies in this Russian firm.  In the firm at hand, 
top management, in particular the CEO, unilaterally determine wages in spite of 
official bargaining between management and trade union representatives. Before the 
financial crisis in 1998, labor turnover was very high in the firm. This turnover was 
driven by voluntary quits as employees saw better opportunities outside the firm. 
However, as of 1996 orders for the firm’s products showed a very robust upturn and 
the firm was in desperate need of qualified production workers, engineers, etc.  To 
attract these qualified employees and to retain them, top management offered real 
wages far above the regional and sector averages.  After the financial crisis of August 
1998 outside opportunities in the local labor market were substantially reduced. This 
enabled top management to extract rents from the firm’s employees through the 
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erosion of real wages via the high inflation that manifested itself during and after the 
financial crisis. It curbed earnings most for those who earned the highest rents, 
resulting in a tremendous compression of real wages that was still in place at the end 
of the reported period.  While nominal wages are never cut in this firm, long lasting 
real earnings losses were very substantial, and this despite a very strong profit 
performance.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section 
introduces the firm under study and describes the personnel data set. Section 3 
presents the main results of our analysis and establishes some robust evidence about 
the evolution of wages and total compensation in the firm over the period that 
encompasses the financial crisis and high inflation. A final section concludes. 
2. The firm and its personnel data 
The particular firm for which we have data is located in a provincial city in Russia 
and operates in the “machine building and metal working” sector. After having 
converted production lines from Soviet times “nearly one hundred percent”, according 
to the director general of the firm (CEO),1 it produces well equipment for gas and oil 
production and smith-press equipment. More than ninety percent of its production is 
destined for the Russian market. It has no local competitors, but nationally it has to 
compete with more than 5 firms, among them firms importing from the European 
Union. The firm was founded in the middle of the last century and privatized in 1992.  
A decade later more than half of the shares were owned by managers and workers, 
about twenty percent by former employees and roughly a quarter by other Russian 
entities. By that time the active share owners were the members of the board of 
directors and top management, to whom dividends are paid as well as to those 
                                                 
1 Interviews were held with the director general of the firm in the spring of 2002 and in April 2007.  
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workers who own “privileged shares.”2 While there is collective bargaining at this 
firm on paper, trade union representatives have virtually no influence on wage policy 
and wages are set unilaterally by top management. Essentially all important decisions 
are taken by top managers and in particular by the CEO of this firm.  
The firm that is analyzed here has an unusual profit performance in the 
reported period in relation to the sector in which it operates.  As Figure 1 shows, the 
profitability of our firm and the profitability of the sector move in opposite directions 
in the years 1997 to 2003. Equally important is the fact that our firm, while having 
declining profits in the three years after 1997, is able to maintain positive profits 
throughout, i.e., there is clearly no dramatic negative impact on profits brought on by 
the crisis of August 1998.  The firm is also unusual in its wage policies compared 
with the machine building and metal working sector, the oblast where it is located and 
the whole economy. Figure 2 shows a real monthly wage paid by our firm in 1997 and 
1998 that is more than 50 percent higher than the wage paid in the sector and more 
than double the wage paid in the region. In the aftermath of the crisis we see a 
precipitous fall of the real wage in our firm, while wages in the economy at large, the 
region and the sector show a more moderate fall. After the crisis the real wage profile 
in the firm stays flat but shows a continuous rise for the three aggregates. By 2003 the 
average real wage in the economy and the sector exceed that in our firm. It is 
noteworthy, though, that the average regional wage remains below the firm’s average 
wage even in 2003.  
The firm that we analyze is clearly not representative of the industrial sector in 
Russia, in that it is more successful than most firms in this sector over the indicated 
period, and in that collective bargaining is not relevant for wage and employment 
                                                 
2 Interview with CEO in April 2007. 
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outcomes. The personnel data of the firm in question are, however, well suited for 
testing hypotheses emanating from the various schools of thought regarding wage 
determination by management in Russian firms since the firm belongs to the minority 
of prosperous enterprises where workers’ institutional influences are very limited and 
thus do not confound this process of wage determination. 
 The construction of the personnel data proceeded as follows. We created an 
electronic file based on records from the personnel archive of the firm, and 
constructed a year-end panel data set for the years 1997 to 2002.3 We have records of 
all employees who were employed at any time during this period.4 The data contain 
information on individuals’ demographic characteristics such as gender, age, marital 
status and number of children, on their educational attainment, retraining and other 
skill enhancement activities before joining the firm and during tenure at the firm. We 
also know the exact date when each employee started work at the firm as well as 
his/her complete working history before that date. We can trace each employee’s 
career within the firm since we have information on the current position and on all 
previous positions and the periods when each of them was filled out by the employee. 
In addition we also know whether someone worked full-time or part-time. For those 
who separated from the firm we can distinguish between voluntary quit, transfer to 
another firm, individual dismissal, group dismissal and retirement.  
In Russian firms the workforce is often divided into five employee categories: 
administration (i.e., management) which we label “managers”; accounting and 
financial specialists whom we label “accountants”; engineering and technical 
specialists (including programmers) whom we subsume under the term “engineers”; 
                                                 
3 We have also wage data for all months in 2003 except for December. However, since we also lack 
data on yearly bonuses for 2003, we do not use the compensation data for 2003 in this paper. 
4 Information for top managers is missing for reasons of confidentiality. 
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primary and auxiliary production workers, whom we label “production workers”; and 
finally, service staff.5  
For the years 1997 to 2002 we have monthly wages averaged over the year, 
and information on the three types of bonuses paid to the workforce: (1) a monthly 
bonus amounting to a fixed percentage of the wage; (2) an extra annual bonus whose 
level depends on “the results of the year” (i.e., a form of profit sharing); (3) an annual 
bonus labeled “other bonus”. While production workers never receive a monthly 
bonus, the bonus labeled “other bonus” is paid to production workers only. Wages are 
reported by the firm as the employee's average monthly wage in rubles for the year (or 
fraction of the year, if not employed for the full 12 months), with no adjustment for 
inflation.  The monthly bonus is reported as a percentage of the average monthly 
wage, and the corresponding ruble figure is recovered by applying the percentage to 
the nominal monthly wage.  The other two bonuses are reported in nominal 
rubles.  The inflation rate in Russia during this period was irregular and sometimes 
quite high - the price level more than doubled between the start of the financial crisis 
in July 1998 and April 1999, and was 0-2% per month before and after - and so some 
care is required to construct appropriate deflators.  Because nominal average monthly 
wage and the nominal monthly bonus are averages for the year, they are deflated into 
1997 constant rubles using an annual average CPI, i.e., the average price level for the 
year relative to the average price level in 1997.  The other two bonuses are paid 
around the end of the year, and so these are converted into 1997 constant rubles using 
                                                 
5 Only production workers are subdivided into levels, primary production workers having eight and 
auxiliary production workers having six levels. The Russian term for service staff is младший 
обслуживающий персонал. 
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the CPI price level for December of the corresponding year, i.e., the December price 
level in that year relative to the average 1997 price level.6  
 
3. Main Results  
 
Employment 
 
Table 1 shows that employment grew steadily from 3,032 employees to 3,221 
employees during the period January 1997 to December 2002, with the exception of 
the post-crisis year 1999. Yet, the composition of the workforce hardly changed 
throughout the period. There is a small increase in the share of workers, compensated 
by negligible falls in the shares of service staff, engineers and accountants, with 
managers accounting for the same share of 3.8 percent throughout.  
Turnover rates, calculated as the sum of hires and separations during a given 
year normalized by the stock at the beginning of the year, were particularly large in 
1997 and 1998 (see Table 2). After the crisis they fell quite dramatically, in 2002 
reaching less than half the level of 1997. This secular pattern holds for all employee 
categories, but turnover was especially turbulent for accountants, production workers 
and service staff and much more modest for engineering staff throughout the period. 
                                                 
6 We have available monthly data on CPI inflation in Russia overall and in the oblast where the firm is 
located.  In this paper we work primarily with average monthly wages, and so we compare average 
annual inflation in the oblast with national rates.  This shows that inflation in the oblast is very similar 
to national inflation:  
 
                 Russia     Oblast  
1997          15.4          14.0  
1998          38.1          38.7  
1999          98.6          97.9  
2000          20.8          20.4  
2001          21.6          19.1  
2002          16.0          14.5  
 
These indices are based on average monthly price levels calculated using monthly inflation rates. Over 
the 1997-2002 period, the cumulative price indices diverge by less than 3%.  Results using wages and 
bonuses deflated by the national CPI are therefore essentially identical to those using the oblast 
CPI.  We use the former in what follows. 
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In addition, while there was a large turnover of managers in the crisis year, there are 
few managers who enter or leave the firm after 1998. 
The fall in turnover rates after the crisis year of 1998 comes about because of 
a fall in separation and hiring rates (see Table 2). The bulk of the separations (about 
80 percent) throughout the period are voluntary quits. Therefore the fall in the 
separation rate in the post-crisis year suggests that the financial crisis restrained many 
employees from quitting. The firm’s employees seem to have been continuously 
confronted with a more limited array of outside options compared with the situation 
before the crisis as we now show.7  
Table 3 that summarizes turnover in a sample of industrial firms from the city 
where our firm resides can tell us something about local labor market conditions in 
the period 1998 to 2001.8 The turnover patterns presented in the regional sample are 
similar to those for the firm in the years 1998 to 2001. In particular, separation rates 
fall by similar percentages for all employee categories, while the fall in inflows is 
more pronounced for our firm than for the regional sample. If we take the turnover 
rate as an indicator of local labor market conditions, we can infer that outside 
opportunities have diminished in a substantial fashion for all employee types 
compared to the period before the crisis. These diminished opportunities can also be 
seen by the movements of the unemployment rate in the given oblast. Being 
substantially lower in the pre-crisis years 1995-1997 than the average rate in the 
Russian Federation, it shot up by roughly five percentage points between 1998 and 
1999, and then showed a cumulative fall of one percentage point in the years 2000 
                                                 
7 One element in an array of outside opportunities was the “suitcase trade”, i.e. traveling between 
Russia and, e.g., China or Turkey and buying and selling certain types of goods informally. Such 
opportunities were severely reduced after the crisis, resulting in a dramatic fall of the number of 
“suitcase traders” throughout Russia (Eder, Yakovlev and Çarkoglu, 2003).  
8 We have a balanced panel of 37 firms that represent roughly 15 percent of industrial employment in 
this city only for these four years.  The data of our firm are included in this panel as we want to 
estimate local labor marker turnover rates. 
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and 2001. While the local unemployment rate was roughly six percentage points 
lower than the Russian average in 1998, it was two percentage points higher in 2001. 
The described trends and relative magnitudes of the unemployment rate as well as the 
presented turnover patterns estimated from a regional sample of industrial firms 
demonstrate that local labor market conditions were decisively worse after the crisis 
year of 1998 and did not recover as rapidly as in the Russian Federation in general.9
      
Wage structure 
 
Figure 4 plots kernel density estimates of the real wage distributions for different 
employee categories in 1997. It is immediately obvious that there is substantial 
heterogeneity in wages within employee categories. Moreover, real wage distributions 
for different employee categories overlap, so that many high paid production workers, 
for example, earned at least as much as lower paid managers. Service staff had the 
lowest mean wages in 1997 followed, somewhat surprisingly, by engineers, then 
production workers and accountants. Managers had the highest wages on average. 
This ranking of employee group-specific wage distributions remains unchanged 
throughout the observation period.  
 Estimates from OLS regressions of log wages in 1997, reported in Table 4, 
show that service staff earn on average 52 percent less than production workers, while 
the latter earn around 6 percent more than engineering staff. Accountants and 
managers earn approximately 50 and 95 percent more than production workers (see 
column (1)). The estimated coefficients from the augmented Mincer wage regression 
in column (1) also illustrate that workers with longer tenure and more education 
receive higher wages. Women earn significantly less than men, while marital status 
                                                 
9 The sample of firms is not representative in terms of development of total employment in the region, 
since we have a balanced panel. However, the estimated inflow and outflow rates are indicative of 
falling outside opportunities after the crisis. 
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and the number of children do not have a significant impact on wages. The mentioned 
factors determine the wage structure throughout the observation period, but the size of 
the effects is attenuated over time.10 For example, while employees with university 
degree earned about 13 percent higher wages than employees with only basic 
education (conditional on employee category) in 1997, their wage mark-up falls to 
only 11 percent in 2002. It is also striking that wage tenure profiles are much flatter in 
2002 than in 1997. In addition, the conditional gender wage gap is reduced between 
1997 and 2002 from 27 to 15 percent, and, with the exception of managers, wage 
differences between employee categories have diminished as well by 2002, an issue to 
which we return later.  
Columns (2) to (6) show wage regressions for the different employee 
categories. It is noteworthy that in 1997 the conditional gender wage gap was nearly 
twice as large for production workers as it was for service staff and nearly three times 
as large in comparison with the gender gap for engineers. Female accountants, on the 
other hand, experienced a wage premium over their male counterparts when one 
controls for other factors. Column (5) also makes clear that the larger returns to higher 
incomplete education compared with the returns to completed higher education for all 
employees was entirely driven by this relationship for accountants. That accountants 
who started but did not finish university had higher wages on average than 
accountants who completed university might strike one as counterintuitive. 
Confronted with this result, the firm’s CEO stated that newly hired university 
graduates specializing in financial matters received low wages as the supply of these 
graduates was large, while experienced accountants who had worked long in the firm 
and some of whom might not have finished higher studies received higher wages. We 
                                                 
10 The regression results for 2002 are not presented here but available on request. 
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should also point out, though, that the estimation results are based on only a small 
number of observations for accountants. In the case of production workers, where the 
number of observations is large, we get the expected result that workers with 
secondary and secondary professional education command higher wages than those 
with basic professional education or less. 
Real total compensation was determined by the same factors as wages. This is 
not surprising since wages made up the lion share of total income in all years as 
Table 5 shows. In the crisis year of 1998, the wage share rose to more than 90 percent 
of total income and then declined to slightly more than three quarters of total income 
in 2002. The shares of all bonus components fell in the crisis year but then more than 
recovered in the remaining years.  
 
Nominal and real rigidity 
 
An inspection of the data reveals that the firm never cuts nominal wages.11 Real 
wages, however, fall markedly in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 1998. Figure 
4 and Figure 5 show that real wages and real monthly compensation (measured as the 
sum of real monthly wages and the monthly share of all real bonus payments for the 
year) in the upper half of the respective distribution fell most, both in absolute and in 
relative terms, and recovered least in post crisis years. As a result, kernel density 
estimates of the wage distributions in 2002, plotted in Figure 6, are clearly to the left 
of the real wage distributions in 1997, for all employee categories. The real wage 
distributions in 2002 also appear more compressed. Exactly the same secular patterns 
                                                 
11 Sources close to the firm’s top management told us that the firm never contemplated to cut nominal 
wages since such cuts might have resulted in even higher quit rates than the ones observed before the 
crisis. 
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can be observed for the real monthly compensation distributions, i.e., between 1997 
and 2002 we get a shift to the left of these distributions and their compression.12  
Who bears the burden of the shock? Individual wage mobility 
 
Even though average real wages fall, not all employees are affected by the crisis in the 
same way. This becomes evident from Figure 7, which plots the kernel density 
estimate of the distribution function of real wage growth between 1997 and 2002. 
These heterogeneous real wage growth rates cause substantial relative wage mobility 
inside the firm as transition rates between quintiles of the wage distribution in 1997 
(the origin state) and in 2002 (the destination state), calculated for the balanced panel 
of those who were continuously employed during the entire period, in Table 5 
reveal.13 For example, only 35 percent of all employees who found themselves in the 
third quintile of the wage distribution in 1997 remain there in 2002, while 41 percent 
move up in the wage distribution and 24 percent move down. This pattern is observed 
for all employment groups, but is particularly marked for production workers.14 The 
transition patterns are also very similar albeit slightly stronger for total compensation. 
Thus, the firm substantially realigned real wages and total compensation during the 
inflationary period following the financial crisis, especially for the core group of the 
firm, the production workers.  
In order to assess whether particular characteristics systematically determine 
relative wage growth, we regress the growth rate of real wages between 1997 and 
2002 on various individual and job characteristics. We restrict the sample to full-time 
employees who were continuously employed during the entire observation period.  
                                                 
12 The real monthly compensation distributions are not shown here but can be provided by the authors. 
13Some scholars studying Russian labor markets in the first half of the 1990’s maintained that there was 
substantial relative wage mobility in the economy at large (see, e.g. Commander et al., 1995). 
14 Transition matrices showing wage and compensation dynamics for different employee categories are 
available from the authors on request. 
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Table 7 contains the regression results with three different specifications of the 
wage growth equation. Specification (1) estimates wage growth as a function of a 
cubic in tenure and age, dummies for highest educational attainment, and 
demographic dummies. This specification assumes that wage growth does not depend 
on an individual’s position in the firm-level wage distribution in 1997. The tenure-
wage growth profile can be characterized as follows: tenure and wage growth are 
inversely related up to approximately 20 years, between 21 and 30 years of tenure 
wage growth remains flat at roughly minus 22 percent, and wage growth then turns 
slightly more negative for longer-tenured employees. On this measure, the firm 
seemed to favor those employees who have been hired more recently. Holding other 
factors constant, female employees earn a substantial premium if the results of the 
model in column 1 are to be believed.  
Specification (2) adds dummies for the employee’s position in the firm-level 
wage distribution in 1997. This model might still be too simplistic, since it assumes 
that all employees were confronted with the same wage distribution in 1997. As we 
have seen, though, the locations and the spreads of the wage distributions for the 5 
employee categories were very different in 1997. To take account of this, 
specification (3) adds controls for the location in the employee category-specific wage 
distribution and dummies for employee categories. The results of specifications (2) 
and (3) are similar, and we concentrate our discussion on the results of 
specification (3).  
The impact of tenure, while somewhat attenuated, remains negative 
throughout the tenure distribution. Secondary professional and higher educational 
attainment imply higher wage growth, while female employees experience smaller 
wage growth than their male counterparts. The latter result, reversing the estimated 
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wage growth premium for female employees in specification (1), can be explained by 
the fact that women find themselves in 1997 in employee and wage segments that 
exhibit the highest growth throughout the reported period.  
The coefficients on the decile dummies strongly confirm our contention that 
employees positioned in 1997 in the lower deciles of their respective wage 
distribution experienced relative gains in the reported period. Location in the lower 
four deciles implies stronger wage growth than for those employees who were 
positioned in 1997 in the median decile. These relative gains are monotonically 
decreasing as we go from the bottom to the 4th decile. In contrast, employees 
positioned in 1997 in the highest four deciles of their wage distribution are confronted 
with relative wage losses. Relative to production workers, service staff and engineers 
have wage gains over the period, while accountants and managers have wage losses 
albeit of a small order. 
In Table 8 we remove the assumption that wage growth is equiproportionate 
for each quantile across all employee categories, and estimate wage growth 
regressions for each employee category separately.15  The results show clear 
differences in the returns to the various deciles for the five employee categories. In 
particular, the relative returns for service staff show a much larger spread across the 
wage distribution than for other employee categories. In addition, production workers 
experience positive wage growth higher up in the wage distribution than other 
employees. The overall result is, however, very clear, no matter what the employee 
category: employees who find themselves in 1997 in the lower part of their respective 
                                                 
15 Since we use balanced panels in these wage growth regressions and since accountants have a very 
volatile relationship with the firm over the reported period, we have a very small number of 
observations for this employee category. This low number is responsible for the insignificance of 
virtually all coefficients in column 4 of Table 8. 
 16
wage distribution experience substantially higher wage growth than those who are 
located in the upper part.   
The estimated effect of all of these determinants on the growth of total 
compensation are very similar, which is not surprising given that the different bonus 
payments only account for a small share of total compensation.  
 
Extraction of rents and approaching the outside option 
As we have seen, local labor market opportunities seem to have fallen substantially 
after the crisis year of 1998. These falling outside opportunities made it possible for 
the top management of the firm to use inflation to erode the rents that the firm’s 
employees enjoyed before the crisis. Table 9, shows that the large positive differences 
between mean wages in the firm and mean wages in the sample of industrial firms 
located in the same local labor market turned either negative towards the end of the 
period or were tremendously reduced. The convergence of average wages in the firm 
towards average wages in the local labor market started after 1999 when employees’ 
rents peaked. The extraction of rents during the period of real wage adjustment was 
quite relentless as a comparison of the entries for 1999 and the entries for 2002 
reveals. If we link these relative wage movements to the information that we provided 
about local labor market conditions, it seems plausible that the top management of the 
firm uses these local labor market conditions as an important element in its calculus 
regarding wage setting. This conjecture is confirmed by the CEO when asked directly 
about the determination of wage levels. According to him, three dimensions are 
relevant for wage determination: the characteristics of a worker, i.e., her/his 
qualification, tenure, seniority and work experience in general; labor market 
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conditions, in particular the wage level in the region and the wage level in the sector; 
and the price of the order in whose production the employee is engaged.  
In sum, given our evidence on the time patterns of regional turnover, the 
regional unemployment rate, declining relative wage gaps and the statement by the 
CEO of the firm, we are confident that local labor market conditions are of paramount 
importance in the calculus of top management when it comes to wage setting. It is 
also our conjecture that in this Russian firm the causal effect runs from turnover to 
wages and not vice versa. This might seem counterintuitive as one would surmise that 
high wages would cause a fall in turnover. However, the efficiency wage models that 
explained the causal effect going from wages to turnover (see, e.g., Salop, 1979) are 
embedded in a mature capitalist economy that finds itself in a steady state. The 
Russian economy in the 1990s was clearly not in a steady state but in great turmoil 
with a tremendous amount of labor reallocation taking place. The CEO of our firm 
paints the following picture of this dramatic period when explaining the development 
of wages in the firm: “Higher than regional wages contributed to retaining and 
attracting highly qualified personnel after difficult crisis years in the beginning of the 
1990s, when episodes of forced downsizing due to the output decline took place. 
Later, in 1995-1996, the firm started to receive orders, production growth began, and 
there was a need for qualified personnel. Since economic improvement happened all 
over the country, the only way to retain and attract personnel was to pay high wages. 
After the 1998 crisis, it was economically expedient to stabilize wages at the regional 
level.”16 In the final analysis market forces work in the case of our Russian firm and 
that in a relentless fashion.  
  
                                                 
16 Cited from the interview of April 2007. 
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Inequality 
 
A detailed analysis of the inequality trends in real wages and compensation 
contributes to a better understanding of the wage determination process in our firm. A 
comparison of the Figures 3 and 6 reveals that real wage distributions become more 
compressed. The difference in the median wage and wages for an employee at the 90th 
percentile of the distribution is reduced by slightly less than 15 percentage points 
during the period from 1997 to 2002. The gap between the wage of an employee at 
the 10th percentile of the wage distribution and the median wage narrowed by 37 
percentage points from 1997 to 2002. Hence, the fall in wage inequality comes about 
by relative wage gains of employees in the lower part of the wage distribution. Gini 
coefficients reported in column (1) of Table 10 corroborate the decline in inequality 
of wages and total compensation for the entire workforce. The Gini coefficients in 
columns (2) – (6) show that wage and compensation inequality falls also within all 
employee categories in the aftermath of the financial crisis. However, this process of 
wage and compensation compression is not monotonic for all employee categories. 
For example, inequality fell to very low levels for service staff and managers in 2001, 
but rises again thereafter.  
The Gini coefficient can be written as G= (2/µ)cov(y,F(y)), where y is income, 
F(y) is the distribution function of y and µ is mean income (see, e.g., Lambert, 2001). 
A simple algebraic manipulation then arrives at the decomposition of G into its 
components by income source:  
∑=
k
kkk SGRG    (1), 
where Rk is the rank correlation of income source k with the distribution of total 
income, Gk is the Gini of income source k and Sk is the share of component k in total 
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income.17 The decomposition of the Gini coefficient by income source is particularly 
interesting in our context to establish the contribution of the various components to 
inequality. The k-th component of equation (1) divided by G, i.e., 
G
SGR kkk , gives us 
the share of income source k in total inequality. Dividing this expression by Sk shows 
the inequality component as a fraction of its income share. Finally, k
kkk S
G
SGR −  
approximates the impact of a 1 percent change of income source k on overall 
inequality. This latter measure can also be understood as income source k’s marginal 
effect relative to the overall Gini (see Lerman and Yitzaki, 1985). 
The upper panel of Table 11 presents the Gini coefficients for the different 
compensation components. Inequality in wages and in the extra bonus gradually falls 
with the exception that inequality in the extra bonus was zero in the crisis year 1998 
since no extra bonus was paid at all. The other two bonus types show a more erratic 
behavior. The compression in total compensation is less pronounced than the 
compression in wages, not least because the Gini coefficients of bonuses were far 
higher than the Gini coefficients of wages (see top panel of Table 11). Despite this 
large difference between the Gini coefficients of bonus payments and the Gini 
coefficient of wages, bonuses contributed little to overall inequality for two reasons. 
First, their shares were small relative to the share of wages (see Table 5). Second, the 
rank correlations of all bonus payments with the distribution of total income were far 
weaker than the nearly perfect rank correlation of wages (see bottom panel of 
                                                 
17 This decomposition is due to Lerman and Yitzaki (1985) who show that 
 . ]/][/),cov(2)][,cov(/),[cov(),cov()/2(
11
µµµµ kkkkkk
K
k
k
K
k
k FyFyFyFyG ∑∑
==
==
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Table 11).18 Wages contributed slightly less to overall inequality than their share in 
total income, as Table 12 demonstrates, and therefore had a (hypothetical) attenuating 
impact on overall inequality in all years as the bottom panel of Table 13 reveals. 
Monthly bonus payments, in contrast, “aggravated” overall inequality in all years 
apart from 1999.  
Alternative measures of inequality such as general entropy indices confirm the 
findings concerning the larger compression of wages and total compensation in the 
upper parts of their distributions. The general entropy index, which is given by  
∑ ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−= i
ix
N
GEI 1)(
)1(
1)( αµααα                       (2), 
where N is the number of observational units, xi is the level of earnings of the i-th 
observational unit, and µ is mean earnings, allows us to assess whether the change in 
inequality is mostly driven by changes at the bottom or by changes at the top of the 
distribution, by varying the parameter α. The index is more sensitive to changes at the 
top of the distribution the larger is α.19 Since the fall in the general entropy index for a 
parameter value of -1 is more pronounced than for a value of 1, we conclude that the 
relative gains at the bottom of the wage and the compensation distributions are the 
more important driving factors of the fall in overall inequality. If we give more weight 
to wages in the lower part of the distribution, our measure of overall wage inequality, 
GEI(-1) indicates that inequality fell by 62 percent between 1997 and 2002. If, on the 
other hand, the index is more sensitive to wages in the upper part of the distribution 
                                                 
18 One might find it puzzling that the Gini of total compensation is very close to the Gini of wages 
given these far higher Gini coefficients for bonus payments. For example in 1997 the Gini of total 
compensation amounts to 0.2928 while the Gini of wages is 0.2802. A simple back of the envelope 
calculation, using equation (1), brings home the point that the large Gk ’s of the bonus components are 
wiped out by their small Sk’s and Rk’s.     
19 GEI(α) encompasses several well known inequality measures: for example, GEI(0) corresponds to 
the mean log deviation, GEI(1) to the Theil index and GEI(2) to one half of the square of the 
coefficient of variation. We use a modified version of the Stata module “descogini” by Alejandro 
Lopez-Feldman for our calculations. See Feldman (2005). 
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then measured overall wage inequality fell by “only” 44 percent (see columns (1) and 
(4) of panel a of Table 13). Falling inequality is mostly driven by compression within 
the lower part of the wage distribution in all employee categories except for 
managers.20  
The general entropy index can also be additively decomposed into the 
“within” and “between” parts of inequality. This decomposition reveals that 
inequality within employee categories dominate overall wage inequality in 1997, 
while in 2002 within and between group inequality are of roughly equal magnitude 
(see columns (2) and (3) as well as columns (5) and (6) of top panel of Table 14). The 
GEI(-1) and GEI(1) measures indicate that within-inequality fell, respectively, by 69 
and 60 percent and that between-inequality was reduced by 37 and 1 percent 
respectively. Most of the compression in the overall wage distribution between 1997 
and 2002 occurred because there was tremendous compression of wages within 
employee categories. These patterns also hold for inequality of total compensation as 
the statistics in the bottom panel of Table 13 demonstrate. We take these patterns as 
additional evidence that local labor market conditions strongly impact on the setting 
of wages in our firm. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Having a rich personnel data set of one Russian firm for the years 1997 to 2002 at our 
disposal, we can trace out the evolution of wages, total compensation and 
employment in a period that included an episode of high inflation during and in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis of 1998. The observed evolution points to “price” 
                                                 
20 For example, wage inequality for service staff and production workers fell by 70 percent and 58 
percent if we take GEI(-1), but only by 60 percent and 41 percent respectively if we use GEI(1) to 
calculate percentage changes in inequality. For managers, on the other hand, these percentage changes 
amount to 64 and 68 percent. Detailed results are available from the authors upon request. 
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rather than “quantity” adjustment within the firm during the crisis as employment 
remained stable but real wages and real compensation fell substantially. Our evidence 
thus shows that the firm did not refrain from substantially cutting real wages, taking 
advantage of a high-inflation environment.   
The downward adjustment of earnings led to persistent welfare losses among 
employees since real wages and real compensation levels had not recovered to pre-
crisis levels by 2002, even though the firm’s financial situation was then better than 
before the crisis. The firm, which was a high-wage firm prior to 1998, made use of the 
high inflation that manifested itself during and in the aftermath of the financial crisis 
in order to extract rents from employees. These welfare losses were, however, not 
spread evenly across all employees, since the firm curbed earnings most for those who 
earned the highest rents, resulting in a tremendous compression of real wages. Wage 
growth regressions spanning the years 1997 to 2002 show disproportionate wage 
growth for those employees located in the lowest four deciles of the wage distribution 
in 1997, while employees positioned in the highest four deciles were confronted with 
relative wage losses. Relative to production workers, service staff and engineers saw 
wage gains over the period, while accountants and managers had small wage losses.  
The firm was in a position to extract rents from its employees because of a fall 
in outside opportunities in the local labor market as evidenced by dramatically falling 
separation rates after 1999. At the bottom end of the firm’s wage distribution there 
are, however, smaller rents before the crisis and the firm seems to pay wages closer to 
the opportunity cost for employees at that end of the distribution throughout the 
reported period.    
Our analysis provides strong evidence for the hypothesis that top managers 
take local labor market conditions into account when deciding on wage levels. In 
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times of very high labor turnover they are willing to pay higher than average real 
wages to attract and retain skilled workers. On the other hand, being reluctant to cut 
nominal wages, they relentlessly cut real wages when market conditions make this 
possible. All in all, our evidence clearly shows that market forces strongly influence 
the wage policies of our firm and that considerations for a stable internal labor market 
are of less concern. 
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Figure 4 Distribution of basic real wage in rubles - all employees 
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Figure 5 Distribution of total real compensation in rubles - all 
employees
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TABLES 
 
 
 
  Table 1: Composition of Workforce (in %), 1997 to 2002 
        
Year 
Service 
staff Engineers 
Production 
workers Accountants Managers Total 
Absolute 
number of 
employees
1997 7.1 24.8 62.1 2.2 3.8 100 3032 
1998 7.0 24.4 62.6 2.1 3.8 100 3081 
1999 6.9 24.6 62.6 2.1 3.8 100 3077 
2000 7.0 24.4 62.8 2.1 3.8 100 3110 
2001 6.9 24.0 63.2 2.0 3.8 100 3175 
2002 6.9 23.7 63.6 1.9 3.8 100 3221 
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Table 2: Hiring and Separation Rates (in %), 1997-2002  
  Service staff   Engineers  
Production 
workers  Accountants  Managers All Employment
Year                  
               
In Out Total In Out Total In Out Total In Out Total In Out Total In Out Total
1997 13.7 14.2 27.8 7.8 7.8 15.5 16.4 15.2 31.5 19.1 23.5 42.6 10.8 9.9 20.7 13.9 13.2 27.1
1998              
                    
                      
                     
                       
13.3 13.3 26.5 6.3 5.8 12.1 18.0 16.1 34.1 20.0 23.1 43.1 16.1 13.4 29.5 14.7 13.5 28.2
1999 7.6 5.7 13.3 5.3 4.9 10.3 11.8 11.8 23.7 11.1 14.3 25.4 4.3 4.3 8.7 9.6 9.5 19.1
2000 9.3 7.4 16.7 6.4 5.7 12.1 10.7 7.6 18.3 8.2 0.0 8.2 3.5 0.0 3.5 9.2 6.7 15.9
2001 7.8 6.8 14.6 5.7 5.1 10.8 11.5 7.4 19.0 13.6 19.7 33.3 5.0 1.7 6.7 9.6 6.5 16.2
2002 5.4 3.6 9.0  2.9 3.0 5.9 8.7 7.8 16.5 8.1 9.7 17.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.7 6.1 12.8
Table 3: Hiring and Separation and Turnover Rates (in %) in sample of industrial firms in the region - 1998-2001  
  Service staff   Engineers  
Production 
workers  Accountants  Managers   All Employment
Year                 
                 
In Out Total In Out Total In Out Total In Out Total In Out Total In Out Total
1998 9.2 21.6 30.8 10.8 13.0 23.8 11.3 12.8 24.1 3.1 4.4 7.5 2.1 5.4 7.5 10.9 12.6 23.5
1999                 
                  
                    
13.2 15.5 28.7 8.6 7.5 16.1 13.1 13.1 26.2 4.1 3.9 8.0 3.6 4.2 7.6 11.5 11.2 22.7
2000 10.1 13.4 23.5 8.3 9.3 17.6 13.1 10.1 23.2 4.7 4.5 9.2 2.6 0.1 2.7 11.2 9.8 21.0
2001 7.2 10.1 17.3 9.1 5.3 14.4 10.9 8.2 19.1 1.8 1.2 3.0 1.7 1.4 3.1 10.2 7.5 17.7
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Table 4: Determinants of wages, 1997 
 Dependent Variable: log(real wage) in 1997 
 All employees
Service 
staff Engineers 
Production 
workers Accountants Managers
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Tenure in years 0.028*** 0.020 0.026* 0.030*** 0.027 0.007 
 [0.007] [0.028] [0.014] [0.010] [0.041] [0.026] 
Tenure squared/100 in years -0.136** -0.269 -0.188 -0.119 -0.471 0.021 
 [0.067] [0.251] [0.134] [0.089] [0.481] [0.237] 
Tenure cube /1000 in years 0.025 0.083 0.04 0.014 0.171 -0.007 
 [0.016] [0.055] [0.033] [0.021] [0.152] [0.058] 
Age in years 0.034 0.013 0.012 -0.005 -0.479 -0.588 
 [0.038] [0.176] [0.074] [0.049] [0.290] [0.424] 
Age squared/100 in years -0.033 -0.009 -0.001 0.08 1.579* 1.541 
 [0.103] [0.469] [0.198] [0.133] [0.819] [1.059] 
Age cube /1000 in years -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.01 -0.162** -0.131 
 [0.009] [0.041] [0.017] [0.012] [0.075] [0.087] 
Basic professional 0.037 0.014  0.036   
 [0.029] [0.087]  [0.033]   
Secondary general 0.079*** -0.027  0.076**   
 [0.028] [0.089]  [0.032]   
Secondary professional 0.097*** 0.028 -0.123 0.100*** 0.615  
 [0.030] [0.104] [0.277] [0.036] [0.390]  
Higher incomplete 0.164** -0.088 -0.065 0.180 1.406** 0.035 
 [0.069] [0.469] [0.284] [0.114] [0.559] [0.167] 
Higher 0.122*** 0.187 -0.073 0.110 0.977** -0.042 
 [0.038] [0.273] [0.277] [0.069] [0.396] [0.053] 
1 if female -0.319*** -0.236*** -0.155*** -0.428*** 0.584** -0.044 
 [0.019] [0.071] [0.030] [0.027] [0.284] [0.060] 
1 if single 0.021 0.476 -0.038 0.074 0.109  
 [0.070] [0.467] [0.167] [0.093] [0.236]  
1 if divorced or widowed -0.009 0.014 -0.081 -0.005 0.004 -0.056 
 [0.035] [0.093] [0.074] [0.050] [0.132] [0.071] 
1 if 1 child -0.011 0.434 -0.064 0.035 0.078 0.418 
 [0.053] [0.507] [0.086] [0.071] [0.207] [0.253] 
1 if more than 1 child 0.042 0.487 -0.055 0.080 0.052 0.444* 
 [0.057] [0.498] [0.096] [0.076] [0.236] [0.254] 
Service staff -0.731***      
 [0.034]      
Engineers -0.064**      
 [0.030]      
Accountants 0.401***      
 [0.060]      
Managers 0.662***      
 [0.051]      
Constant -0.622 -1.281 -0.015 -0.252 3.422 7.886 
  [0.456] [2.150] [0.924] [0.583] [3.383] [5.539] 
Observations 3040 213 790 1838 76 123 
R-squared 0.35 0.1 0.06 0.24 0.49 0.16 
OLS Estimates. Standard errors in brackets     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
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Table 5: Shares of Monthly Compensation Components 
Year Monthly 
Wage 
Monthly Bonus Extra 
Bonus
Other Bonus 
1997 0.830 0.080 0.051 0.039 
1998 0.916 0.059 0.000 0.025 
1999 0.870 0.066 0.043 0.021 
2000 0.854 0.066 0.042 0.038 
2001 0.797 0.081 0.098 0.025 
2002 0.776 0.095 0.088 0.041 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Transition probabilities between quintiles of real wages in 1997 and 2002 (in %); all 
continuous employees  
  Quintile in real wage distribution (2002)   
   1 2 3 4 5 N (1997) 
1 57.89 30.47 8.59 1.39 1.66 361 
2 28.5 34.35 25 10.28 1.87 428 
3 4.81 19.24 34.87 35.27 5.81 499 
4 0.73 5.13 12.96 49.39 31.78 409 
Q
ui
nt
ile
 in
 re
al
 
w
ag
e 
di
st
rib
ut
io
n 
(1
99
7)
 
5 0 0.49 4.62 22.38 72.51 411 
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Table 7: Real wage growth 1997-2002 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Tenure in years -0.038*** -0.029*** -0.020** 
 [0.013] [0.009] [0.009] 
Tenure squared/100 in years 0.160** 0.155*** 0.101** 
 [0.077] [0.053] [0.052] 
Tenure cube /1000 in years -0.022* -0.022** -0.013 
 [0.013] [0.009] [0.009] 
Age in years 0.04 -0.001 -0.016 
 [0.052] [0.036] [0.034] 
Age squared/100 in years -0.119 -0.005 0.039 
 [0.124] [0.086] [0.081] 
Age cube /1000 in years 0.011 0.000 -0.003 
 [0.010] [0.007] [0.006] 
Basic professional 0.000 -0.008 0.000 
 [0.028] [0.019] [0.019] 
Secondary general -0.012 0.024 0.016 
 [0.024] [0.017] [0.016] 
Secondary professional 0.032 0.097*** 0.037** 
 [0.023] [0.016] [0.019] 
Higher incomplete 0.056 0.144*** 0.066* 
 [0.057] [0.039] [0.040] 
Higher 0.023 0.131*** 0.047** 
 [0.024] [0.017] [0.022] 
1 if female 0.087*** -0.035*** -0.050*** 
 [0.016] [0.012] [0.012] 
1 if single -0.061 -0.045 -0.057 
 [0.080] [0.055] [0.053] 
1 if divorced or widowed -0.015 -0.043** -0.044** 
 [0.027] [0.019] [0.018] 
1 if 1 child 0.098 0.056 0.045 
 [0.062] [0.043] [0.041] 
1 if more than 1 child 0.063 0.059 0.047 
 [0.064] [0.044] [0.042] 
Position in firm-level wage distribution:    
1st decile  0.563***  
  [0.022]  
2nd decile  0.218***  
  [0.024]  
3rd decile  0.119***  
  [0.023]  
4th decile  0.033  
  [0.023]  
6th decile  -0.098***  
  [0.022]  
7th decile  -0.090***  
  [0.023]  
8th decile  -0.184***  
  [0.024]  
9th decile  -0.195***  
  [0.023]  
10th decile  -0.304***  
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  [0.024]  
Position in employee category specific wage 
distribution:    
1st decile   0.559*** 
   [0.021] 
2nd decile   0.251*** 
   [0.020] 
3rd decile   0.183*** 
   [0.022] 
4th decile   0.134*** 
   [0.020] 
6th decile   0.01 
   [0.022] 
7th decile   -0.088*** 
   [0.021] 
8th decile   -0.193*** 
   [0.022] 
9th decile   -0.154*** 
   [0.020] 
10th decile   -0.291*** 
   [0.021] 
Service staff   0.286*** 
   [0.018] 
Engineers   0.151*** 
   [0.018] 
Accountants   -0.078** 
   [0.039] 
Managers   -0.089*** 
   [0.028] 
Constant -0.425 -0.056 0.015 
  [0.699] [0.482] [0.459] 
Observations 1824 1824 1824 
R-squared 0.07 0.56 0.61 
Standard errors in brackets    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
 
 Service staff Engineers
Production 
workers Accountants Managers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tenure in years -0.143** 0.013 -0.027** -0.239 -0.025
[0.069] [0.011] [0.013] [0.157] [0.024]
Tenure squared/100 in years 0.982* -0.082 0.141* 1.683 0.093
[0.553] [0.066] [0.075] [1.089] [0.142]
Tenure cube /1000 in years -0.209 0.015 -0.019 -0.335 -0.008
[0.134] [0.012] [0.013] [0.231] [0.025]
Age in years -0.234 -0.02 0.046 -0.532 0.914*
[0.148] [0.033] [0.055] [1.170] [0.468]
Age squared/100 in years 0.55 0.042 -0.103 1.08 -1.978*
[0.348] [0.076] [0.132] [2.834] [1.029]
Age cube /1000 in years -0.042 -0.003 0.007 -0.071 0.141*
[0.027] [0.006] [0.010] [0.225] [0.075]
Basic professional 0.058 -0.460*** -0.018
[0.050] [0.146] [0.023]
Secondary general 0.004 -0.001
[0.052] [0.019]
Secondary professional 0.057 -0.012 0.028 0.172 -0.066
[0.063] [0.026] [0.024] [0.447] [0.068]
Higher incomplete -0.029 0.053 -0.011
[0.235] [0.103] [0.813]
Higher 0.125 -0.005 -0.039 0.337 -0.025
[0.163] [0.026] [0.047] [0.483] [0.068]
1 if female -0.036 0.006 -0.111*** -0.29 -0.015
[0.041] [0.011] [0.021] [0.427] [0.028]
1 if single -0.247 0.031 0.139
[0.230] [0.075] [0.087]
1 if divorced or widowed -0.101* -0.016 -0.025 -0.441** 0.002
[0.056] [0.029] [0.026] [0.192] [0.028]
1 if 1 child -0.066 -0.028 0.232*** 0.067 -0.013
[0.051] [0.035] [0.073] [0.166] [0.020]
1 if more than 1 child -0.012 0.219***
[0.039] [0.074]
Position in employee category 
specific wage distribution:
1st decile 0.617*** 0.403*** 0.674*** 0.466 0.419***
[0.085] [0.022] [0.032] [0.294] [0.041]
2nd decile 0.287*** 0.213*** 0.270*** 0.264 0.278***
[0.080] [0.022] [0.029] [0.275] [0.047]
3rd decile -0.037 0.161*** 0.202*** -0.003 0.254***
[0.082] [0.022] [0.034] [0.363] [0.043]
4th decile 0.259*** 0.085*** 0.137*** 0.052 0.103**
[0.088] [0.022] [0.030] [0.286] [0.043]
6th decile -0.083 -0.087*** 0.086** 0.107 -0.147***
[0.083] [0.023] [0.035] [0.310] [0.045]
7th decile -0.314*** -0.140*** -0.033 -0.175 -0.116***
[0.084] [0.022] [0.031] [0.262] [0.043]
8th decile -0.550*** -0.186*** -0.162*** -0.043 -0.123***
[0.085] [0.023] [0.034] [0.344] [0.039]
9th decile -0.621*** -0.189*** -0.086*** 0.042 -0.158***
[0.084] [0.022] [0.030] [0.274] [0.050]
10th decile -0.761*** -0.287*** -0.241*** -0.096 -0.268***
[0.084] [0.023] [0.032] [0.295] [0.044]
Constant 4.054* 0.224 -1.018 8.929 -14.044**
[2.070] [0.438] [0.733] [16.054] [7.005]
Observations 151 611 934 36 92
R-squared 0.83 0.75 0.53 0.69 0.9
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 8: Real wage growth 1997-2002 by employee category
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      Table 9 
  
Differences between average wages in firm and average wages in sample of  
industrial firms in the region in 1997 rubles: 1998-2002 
Year Service workers Engineers Workers Accountants Managers 
1998 100 133 379 792 1468 
1999 346 391 803 805 1898 
2000 123 -28 261 223 1056 
2001 81 -82 195 279 805 
2002 -61 -24 119 150 551 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10 
Evolution of earnings inequality measured by Gini coefficients  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel a: Wages 
Year 
Entire 
workforce 
Service 
staff Engineers Workers Accountants Managers 
1997 0.2801 0.2474 0.2294 0.2507 0.1912 0.1367 
1998 0.251 0.1484 0.2239 0.2003 0.1417 0.1082 
1999 0.2453 0.0853 0.1954 0.1854 0.1267 0.1202 
2000 0.2456 0.0649 0.1786 0.1945 0.1705 0.072 
2001 0.2189 0.055 0.1679 0.1792 0.1583 0.0438 
2002 0.1995 0.1618 0.1437 0.1725 0.1409 0.0482 
       
       
Panel b: Total compensation 
Year 
Entire 
workforce 
Service 
staff Engineers Workers Accountants Managers 
1997 0.2928 0.2416 0.2293 0.2456 0.1903 0.1488 
1998 0.2547 0.1474 0.2248 0.2015 0.1423 0.1077 
1999 0.2444 0.0855 0.1964 0.1823 0.131 0.1202 
2000 0.2464 0.0669 0.1792 0.1972 0.1787 0.073 
2001 0.2271 0.0684 0.1681 0.1778 0.1696 0.0447 
2002 0.2211 0.162 0.1455 0.1845 0.1454 0.0484 
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Table 11 
Gini decomposition by income source 
Year Monthly 
Wage 
Monthly 
Bonus 
Extra 
Bonus 
Other 
Bonus 
 
Gini by income source
1997 0.2802 0.8069 0.63 0.725 
1998 0.251 0.7933 - 0.7027 
1999 0.2453 0.7846 0.5467 0.7788 
2000 0.2457 0.7759 0.5488 0.7271 
2001 0.219 0.7658 0.352 0.7367 
2002 0.1996 0.758 0.2724 0.7209 
 
Gini correlation of income source with distribution of total income
1997 0.9752 0.6052 0.5787 0.2968 
1998 0.9893 0.4063 - 0.4621 
1999 0.9895 0.2838 0.5298 0.371 
2000 0.9775 0.3499 0.3805 0.5315 
2001 0.9711 0.5007 0.6761 0.192 
2002 0.9586 0.5955 0.8062 0.3527 
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Table 12 
Contributions of source incomes on inequality 
Year Monthly 
Wage 
Monthly 
Bonus 
Extra 
Bonus 
Other 
Bonus 
 
Share of source income in total inequality
1997 0.7749 0.1333 0.063 0.0288 
1998 0.8929 0.0756 - 0.0315 
1999 0.8643 0.06 0.0513 0.0245 
2000 0.8324 0.0731 0.0354 0.0591 
2001 0.7462 0.1364 0.1021 0.0153 
2002 0.6707 0.1947 0.0875 0.047 
 
Inequality components as a fraction of income shares
1997 0.9333 1.6677 1.2451 0.7349 
1998 0.9748 1.2748 - 1.275 
1999 0.9932 0.911 1.185 1.1823 
2000 0.9745 1.1016 0.8473 1.5682 
2001 0.936 1.6878 1.0476 0.6227 
2002 0.8649 2.041 0.9928 1.1495 
 
Impact of 1% change in income source on inequality 
1997 -0.0554 0.0534 0.0124 -0.0104 
1998 -0.0231 0.0163 - 0.0068 
1999 -0.0059 -0.0059 0.008 0.0038 
2000 -0.0218 0.0067 -0.0064 0.0214 
2001 -0.051 0.0556 0.0046 -0.0093 
2002 -0.1048 0.0993 -0.0006 0.0061 
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Table 13 
General Entropy Index (GEI) and its decomposition into within and between 
parts 
        
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
Panel a: Wages
Year GEI(-1)  GEI(+1) 
  Total Within Between   Total Within Between 
        
1997 0.1904 0.1515 0.0389  0.1263 0.0914 0.0348 
1998 0.1379 0.097 0.0409  0.1001 0.0637 0.0363 
1999 0.1151 0.07 0.0451  0.0958 0.0538 0.042 
2000 0.1082 0.0626 0.0456  0.0938 0.0539 0.0399 
2001 0.095 0.0528 0.0421  0.076 0.0444 0.0315 
2002 0.0762 0.0544 0.0217  0.0645 0.0399 0.0245 
        
Panel b: Total compensation
Year GEI(-1)  GEI(+1) 
  Total Within Between   Total Within Between 
        
1997 0.195 0.1453 0.0497  0.1446 0.086 0.0348 
1998 0.1379 0.0976 0.0402  0.1061 0.0636 0.0363 
1999 0.1144 0.0688 0.0456  0.0991 0.0525 0.042 
2000 0.1086 0.0651 0.0434  0.0987 0.0546 0.0399 
2001 0.1017 0.0554 0.0462  0.0853 0.0435 0.0315 
2002 0.0941 0.0636 0.0304   0.0826 0.0433 0.0245 
 
 
 
 
 
